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Abstract
This paper analyses how the economic, demographic and institutional di¤erences
between two regions -one developed and called the North, the other emerging and
called the South- drive the international capital ows and explain the world eco-
nomic equilibrium. To this end, we develop a simple two-period OLG model. We
compare closed-economy and open-economy equilibria. We consider that openness
facilitates convergence of Souths characterics towards Norths. We examine suc-
cessively the consequences of a technological catching-up, a demographic transition
and an institutional convergence of pension schemes. We determine the analytical
solution of the dynamics of the world interest rate and deduce the evolution of the
current accounts. These analytical results are completed by numerical simulations.
They show that the technological catching-up alone leads to a welfare loss for the
North in reason of capital ows towards the South. If we add to this rst change
a demographic transition, the capital demand is reduced in the South whereas its
saving increases in reason of a higher life expectancy. These two e¤ects contribute to
reduce the capital ows from the North to the South. Finally, an institutional con-
vergence of the two pension schemes reduces the Souths saving rate which increases
the capital ow from the North to the South. Keywords: International capital ows,
OLG, economic convergence, demographic transition. JEL codes: D91, F40, J10,
O33.
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Introduction
In all regions of the world, population is aging, but at di¤erent paces, and according to
the United Nations (2013) demographic projections, this phenomenon should go on until
after the end of the century. This generalized but unequal aging process is occurring in
a world of increasing capital mobility and technological transfers, which can o¤er new
opportunities for trade between regions. Moreover, this aging process increases the demo-
graphic dependency putting the unfunded pension schemes under pressure in developed
countries, which in turn induces countries to change their rules of sharing of resources
between generations, which infers on the individual choices of savings. Conversely, in the
emerging countries, the unequal sharing of growth benets and a longer life expectancy
could encourage governments to settle or improve unfunded pension schemes and smooth
the di¤erences in welfare across generations. How in a globalized economy these antago-
nistic problematics resolve?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the demographic and economic di¤er-
ences between countries and their changes, notably their reduction resulting from realistic
convergence process, a¤ect the world market equilibrium, and how each domestic charac-
teristic explains the internal equilibrium. This issue has been partly addressed in applied
versions of multi-regional and multi-period OLG model (Aglietta et al., 2002 and 2007;
Börsch-Supan et al., 2002; Fehr et al., 2003 and 2005; Attanazio et al., 2007; Marchiori,
2011; Coeurdacier et al., 2015). However, in such "big" computational models, it is not
easy a task to disentangle the role of the di¤erent factors.
For the sake of clarity, in this paper, we then develop a two-country two-period OLG
model of the world economy where a strong heterogeneity is assumed among the countries.
This heterogeneity focuses on the demographic, economic and institutional characteris-
tics. Also, we suppose that each region has specic levels of demographic growth, life
expectancy, Social Security size and total factors productivity. The analytical approach
adopted in the paper allows to detail the weight of the various components of world
economic growth. The world economy is divided into two regions: one developed and
called the North, the other emerging and called the South. We compare closed with open
economies in a two-region framework. We characterize the analytical solution of the dy-
namics of the world interest rate. Everything else being equal, when nancial markets
open, we show that capital ights from the North to South and that, due to the demo-
2
graphic expansion of the South, Souths economic and social patterns determine the new
world equilibrium in the long run. However, as mentioned above, it is very unlikely that
the South will not experience a demographic transition, a technological catching-up and
a development of its pension schemes. In this perspective, we then propose numerical
simulations based on a calibration that mimics the North-South di¤erences. Our results
show that the technological catching-up alone leads to a welfare loss for the North in
reason of additional capital ows towards the South. If we add to this rst change a
demographic transition, the capital demand is reduced in the South whereas its saving
increases in reason of a higher life expectancy. These two e¤ects contribute to reduce the
capital ows from the North to the South. Finally, an institutional convergence of the
two pension schemes reduces the Souths saving rate which increases the capital ow from
the North to the South.
Two-country two-period OLG theoretical models of the world economy, represented
as a closed system, have rst been proposed by Fried (1980) and Buiter (1981). Eaton
(1987), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) also used two-country OLG models to study trade and
related issues. Eaton (1987) studies the international trade in a context of specic factors.
The two-sector OLG model developed by Galor (1992) was extended to a two-country
framework by Galor and Lin (1994), Mountford (1998), Guilló (2001), Jelassi and Sayan
(2004), S. Sayan (2005), Naito and Zhao (2009), Song et al. (2011) and Yakita (2012).
These studies focus mainly on the consequences of the economic openness on the sectorial
specialization and on welfare considerations. Some of these studies have investigated the
demographic issues but none coped explicitly with the technological di¤erences in the
process of catching-up.
In one-sector models, Adema et al. (2008), Eugeni (2015) and Bárány et al. (2015)
introduce Social Security. Adema et al. (2008) conclude "a country using a funded pension
system experiences negative spillovers from the fact that the other country uses a pay-
as-you-go system". Eugeni (2015) adresses the global imbalance issue. She explains the
"saving behavior of emerging economies and capital outows to the United States can be
attributed to their poor pay-as-you-go systems". In her setting, there is no demographic
transition. By contrast, in Bárány et al. (2015), the Social Security parameters adapt
with demographic transition inducing an increase in contribution rates but a decrease
(or at least no increase) in the replacement rate, meaning less generous pensions. In the
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long run, economic and social development makes the persistance of the lack of pension
generosity in the South unlikely. In this perspective, we assert, as suggested by ndings
of Clements et al. (2011), that it is strongly relevant to deal with the issue of Social
Security convergence in the emerging countries. Note that part of this literature has
focused on global imbalances induced by di¤erences in time preference (Aglietta et al,
2002 and 2007), in public expenditure (Eugeni, 2015) or in nancial rigidities (Song et
al., 2011; Coeurdacier et al., 2015). However, in this paper, we focus only in long run
convergence by assuming that the worldwide nancial market is fully integrated as soon
as openness occurs. Moreover, we consider only regional private transfers, setting aside
foreign transactions and public debts. Taking into account these two assumptions, as
empirically shown by Reinhardt et al. (2013) and by Alfaro et al. (2014), the Lucas
(1990) paradox disappears and the neoclassical framework proprieties apply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents some data illustrating past and
forthcoming trends about catching-up, aging and institutional convergence. Section 2
presents the model and the proprieties of the equilibrium in closed economy. Section 3
compares the equilibrium in open economy with the previous one. Section 4 investigates
three types of convergence. First, we examine a technological catching-up process. Then,
we suppose this process is completed by a demographic transition. Finally, institutional
convergence in the pension scheme is added. Last section concludes.
1 Demographics, Economics and Social Security: Global
Trends
The UN forecasts (table 1) show that the length of life expectancy at birth has increased,
between 1960 and 2010, by 9 years in the North and 21 years in the South, dramatically
crushing the North-South gap from 24 to 8 years. This trend illustrates a long run
convergence process which is linked to economic growth (Aghion et al, 2010). Moreover,
in the same period, the current fertility rate in the South lies just below that prevailing in
the North in 1960, reducing the gap from 3 to 0.9. The microeconomic (Becker, 1991) and
microdemographic (Caldwell, 1976) rationale for the average number of children per family
focuses on the quality-quantity tradeo¤. In this theoretical framework, the economic
growth improves standards of living, putting pressure on the fertility rate by favouring
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quality over quantity. As to the resulting population growth, it has been strongly reduced
(divided by 3.4) in the North but it stays at a positive rate because the lengthening
of life expectancy has largely o¤set an insu¢ cient fertility rate (1.64 instead of 2.1 for
maintaining the 1:1 ratio between generations). In the South, the population growth has
signicantly reduced but it stays at a higher rate than the one observed in the North
in 1960. Between 1960 and 2010, the share of the North in the world population has
been roughly divided by two. In the future, if the South population growth rate does
not converge towards that of the North, i.e. zero (if a stable population is assumed), the
relation between economic growth and demographic evolution will be only explained by
South characteristics.
years 1950 1980 2010 2040 2070 2100
Life North 64.7 72.8 76.9 82.2 86 88.9
expectancy South 41.6 60 67 73.9 78.1 80.8
at birth South (% of North) 64.4 82.3 87.1 90 90.8 90.9
Total fertility North 2.83 1.84 1.66 1.85 1.91 1.93
(children South 6.08 4.18 2.69 2.32 2.12 1.99
per woman) South (% of North) 215 227 162 126 111 103
Annual North 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.02 -0.03 -0.05
population South 2.06 2.15 1.33 0.68 0.3 0.13
growth (%) S-N 0.85 1.55 1.03 0.66 0.33 0.18
Table 1. Demographic transition (United Nations, 2013)
These demographic changes in both South and North took place along with an im-
pressive economic growth. Since 1960, the GDP per capita has more than tripled in the
North and increased vefold in the South (Wang et al., 2011). The per capita wealth
in the South has increased by about 50%, highlighting a fast technological catching-up.
Considering as Wang et al. (2011) that this process will go on, the forecast Souths GDP
per capita is 25% of Norths in 2040 against 12.7 in the 2000s (Table 2).
5
years 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010 2020 2030 20401
North (average annual change, %) 2.3 1.6 0.6 NA NA NA NA
South (level, % of North) 9.5 10.1 12.7 15.6 19.2 23.8 25
Table 2. GDP per capita: evolution and convergence (2005 PPP USD; source: OECD,
Wang et al., 2011, based on World Development Indicators of the World Bank).
In the South, economic development and demographic transition are likely to modify
the share of income between young and old. Otherwise, elderly people would benet less
from growth than young people. As can be seen in Table 3 based on Clements et al.
(2011), the Social Security will continue to expand in the South with the catching-up and
aging process. Therefore, the Souths pension scheme size is expected to reach 82% of
Norths in 2050 against 51% in 2010.
years 1960 1980 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
North 3.9 6.9 8.2 8.5 9.3 9.9 10
South 1.1 2.7 4.2 4.9 6.1 7.1 8.2
South (% of North) 28 39 51 58 66 72 82
Table 3. Public pension expenditures (% of GDP), (source: Clements et al, 2011 based
on data from OECD, EC, ILO and IMF)
These convergence processes are concomitant and these changes will impact the net
savings needs of each region. In a nancially globalized world, identifying how each of
these dynamics congervence contributes to global capital allocation is central. To this
e¤ect, we propose in the following a structural model of the world economy.
2 The Model
The world is divided into 2 regions, one developed and called the North, the other emerg-
ing and called the South. Each region hosts three categories of economic agents: the
households, the rms, and a public sector.
1Following Wang et al. (2011), we forecast the year 2040 by assuming all gaps continue to narrow at
the same average speed as between 1990 and 2010.
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Households are composed of two adults of the same generation. Their life spans over
two periods. In the rst period, each household works, consumes, saves and does not value
leisure. The second period breaks into two subperiods. The rst subperiod is dedicated to
work and consumption while the second subperiod is retirement time when they consume
their savings and their pension income. Households are supposed to maximize life-cycle
utility. Their savings are invested into one nancial asset, which is an ownership title in
the rmsproductive capital.
The productive sector is modeled as a set of perfectly competitive rms which produce
a single good relying on a technology combining capital and labor. It can be consumed
or invested. At the optimum of production, the factors of production are remunerated
at their marginal productivity. The good and the nancial assets are freely traded on
perfectly competitive markets.
The public sector is reduced to an unfunded pension scheme which nances pension
benets of retired people by taxing earnings of contemporaneous workers.
2.1 Households
Each household lives for two periods respectively denoted "young" and "old". At each
period t and for a given region i, growth in the number of young is characterized by:
Ni;t
Ni;t 1
= Gi;t (1)
where Ni;t denotes the corresponding number of young people in t. Besides, old people
live only a fraction of the second period (life expectancy) denoted i;t+1. Note that, in
order to avoid the annuity puzzle, we have modeled without loss of generality the length
of life as a deterministic process.
When young in t, they work, consume and save income for the second period of their
life. In addition, they contribute to a PAYG retirement system. Their rst period budget
constraint is then:
Ci;t + Si;t = (1   i;t)  wi;t (2)
where Ci;t denotes consumption when young, Si;t the savings, wi;t the wage and  i;t the
contribution rate.
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When old in t + 1, they go on working a fraction li;t+1 of their second life period
(mandatory length of work and/or legal age of retirement) and they consume all their
income which corresponds to their savings with interest, their net wage during the period
they work and their due pension for the rest of their life. The second period budget
constraint is then:
i;t+1  Zi;t+1 = (1   i;t+1)  wi;t+1  li;t+1 +Ri;t+1  Si;t +
 
i;t+1   li;t+1
  Pi;t+1 (3)
where Zi;t+1 denotes the consumption when old in t + 1, Ri;t+1 the interest factor, Pi;t+1
the pension and li;t+1  i;t+1.
Young individuals in t are characterized by the following lifetime utility function:
lnCi;t +   i;t+1  lnZi;t+1 (4)
where  < 1 denotes the discount factor.
Let us consider:

i;t = (1   i;t)  wi;t + (1   i;t+1)  li;t+1  wi;t+1Ri;t+1 +
 
i;t+1   li;t+1
  Pi;t+1
Rt+1
(5)
the lifetime income of young. Their consumption obtained by maximizing utility (4) under
constraints (2) and (3) is then characterized by Ct =

i;t
1+i;t+1 . It yields according to eq.
(5) that savings can be expressed as:
Si;t = (1   i;t)  wi;t   
i;t1+i;t+1 (6)
= si;t  (1   i;t)  wi;t   (1  si;t)  (1  i;t+1)li;t+1wi;t+1+(i;t+1 li;t+1)Pi;t+1Ri;t+1
where si;t =
i;t+1
1+i;t+1 denotes the marginal propensity to save the current income and
(1  si;t) the marginal propensity to consume the future income. Note that marginal
propensity to save is an increasing function of life expectancy and interest rate.
2.2 PAYG retirement system
Assuming that the budget of the retirement system is balanced at each period, it follows
that:
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(Ni;t +Ni;t 1  li;t)   i;t  wi;t =
 
i;t   li;t
 Ni;t 1  Pi;t:
When considering the population evolution process characterized by eq. (1) and Social
Securitys balanced budget, the pension is dened as:
Pi;t = i;t  wi;t: (7)
where i;t =
Gi;t+li;t
i;t li;t   i;t is the replacement rate.
2.3 Firms
There is a single homogenous good in the world produced by rms in each region according
to a Cobb-Douglas technology Yi;t = Ai;t Ki;t  L1 i;t , where Yi;t denotes the output, Ai;t
the total factor productivity (TFP), Ki;t the capital stock and Li;t the labor. Assuming
total depletion of capital over the period and perfectly competitive production sector,
prot maximisation yields:
wi;t = Ai;t  (1  )  ki;t (8)
Ri;t = Ai;t    k 1i;t (9)
where ki;t =
Ki;t
Li;t
denotes capital per worker.
2.4 Closed-economy equilibrium
Considering closed economies, in each region and at each period, labor markets must clear
at equilibrium:
Li;t = Ni;t +Ni;t 1  li;t = (Gi;t + li;t) Ni;t, 8i;8t (10)
as also must nancial markets:
Ki;t+1 = Ni;t  Si;t, 8i;8t: (11)
From eqs. (1) and (6) (11) we can then show that in each region the dynamic general
equilibrium is characterized by:
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Ri;t+1 = R

i;t  1 i;t ; 8i and 8t (12)
wherei;t =

(1+A^i;t+1)[(Gi;t+1+li;t+1)+(1 )(1 si;t)(li;t+1+Gi;t+1 i;t+1)]
(1 )si;t(1  i;t)

and Ai;t+1
Ai;t
=

1 + A^i;t+1
1 
.
i;t captures the regional relative tension between demand (numerator) and supply
(denominator) of capital.
At the steady state, we have:
Ri =

1 + A^i

 [  (Gi + li) + (1  )  (1  si)  (li +Gi   i)]
(1  )  si  (1   i) , 8i: (13)
To calculate the steady state interest rates in the closed economies, let us assume
that a period spreads over 30 years. If we assume that individuals enter the job market
at 18 and, following demographic features of 2010, we set N = 1 in the North, which
corresponds to a 60-year lifespan at age 18 (United Nations, 2013). Thereafter, as life
expectancy at age 18 is 55 years in the South, we set 1+S
2
= 55
60
; then S = 0:83. From
the United Nations (2013), the world populations share of people between age 18 and 47
in the South is 83:47% in 2010. Accordingly, at the initial period, we set NN;0 = 20 and
NS;0 = 101. Fixing from the beginning a stable population in the North implies GN = 1
and its size is then always equal to 2  NN;0. Conversely, the number of living people in
the South depends on the demographic transition and, at any date t, evolves as follows:
NS;t + S;t NS;t 1 = NS;t 

1 +
S;t
GS;t

: (14)
Finally, to complete the mimicking of the structure of the world population in 2010, we
set GS;0 such that
101

1+ 0:83
GS;0

101

1+ 0:83
GS;0

+220
= 78:94%, and then GS;0 = 1:715.
Besides the demographic factors, we assume an annual discount time factor equal
to 0:98, so that  = 0:9830  0:55. As usual we set the capitals share in output to
 = 0:3. We then consider the Social Security expenditures towards elderly in 2010.
Following Table 3, in the North they amount to 8:2% of GDP, i.e. 8:2
1 % of the wage bill:
N;0 = 11:7%. In the South, they amount to 4:2% of GDP. Accordingly, S;0 = 6%. We
consider the legal retirement age equal to 65 years both in the North and in the South,
implying lN = lS = 1730 = 0:57.
In case there is no technological innovation in the North and no technological conver-
gence of the South with the North, the interest factor is equal to 3:56 in the North and
4:89 in the South, which corresponds respectively to an annual rate of 4:3% and 5:4%.
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  G N0  (%) l A^
North (N) 0.3 0.55 1 1 20 11.7 0.57 0
South (S) 0.3 0.55 0.83 1.715 101 6 0.57 0
Table 3. Calibration parameters
Considering this calibration with stationary technology (A^ = 0), both North and
Souths computed interest rates are higher than the economic growth rate, reecting
dynamic e¢ ciency. This is obvious for the North. As we consider no technological growth
and no population growth, the economic growth is nil. As for the South, it has no
technological growth, but its population is growing. On a steady state basis, the economic
growth is then equal to the population growth, YS
YS; 1
  1 = 1:715%, which is lower than
the interest rate: rS;annual = 5:4% > gS;annual = 1:8%. As we will see, this feature is
central to analyse the impact of openness on both economies.
3 Openness and globalized nance
We now contemplate a nancial globalized economy. The good and the nancial asset
are freely traded on perfectly competitive world markets. There are no money and no
non-tradable local good. The PPP condition is satised. Workers are immobile making
both labor markets local. The capital market must clear at each date at equilibrium such
as:
X
i
Ki;t+1 =
X
i
Ni;t  Si;t, 8t: (15)
In a two-country world model, this equilibrium condition can be rewritten as a capital
ow from the North (excess of savings: NN;t  SN;t  KN;t) towards the South to satisfy
an excess of capital demand (KS;t  NS;t  SS;t):
NN;t  SN;t  KN;t = KS;t  NS;t  SS;t, 8t:
From eqs. (1), (6) (10) and (15), we show that the world dynamic general equilibrium
yields an equilibrium world interest rate denoted Rt.
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Proposition 1: At the general equilibrium, the world interest factor can write as a
geometric average of the past interest factor and the weighted arithmetic average of the
regional tension between demand and supply of capital:
Rt+1 = R

t  1 t (16)
where t = ('t  N;t + (1  't)  S;t) ; 't =
sN;t(1 N;t)N;tA
1
1 
N;tP
i si;t(1  i;t)i;tA
1
1 
i;t
2 (0; 1] and i;t =
Ni;tP
iNi;t
is the share of region i in the world young population.
t captures the international tension between demand and supply of capital which
expresses as a convex combination of the two regional tensions.
Corollary 1: Starting from closed-economy steady states, ceteris paribus, openness
yields:
t = 't RN + (1  't) RS (17)
where RN and RS denote respectively the closed-economy steady-states values of the in-
terest factor in the North and in the South as dened in equation (13). In addition,
R0 =

 R
1
 1
N + (1  ) R
1
 1
S
 1
(18)
where  = (1+lN )N;0
(1+lN )N;0+(GS+lS)(1 N;0)A
1
1 
S;0
2 [0; 1], AN;0 = 1 and AS;0  AN . The dynam-
ics of the world interest rate is then monotonous and such that Rt 2 [RN ; RS] ; 8t  0.
If variables in the model are xed, i.e. xi;t = xi 8t, where x = G; l; s;  ; A, this
dynamics rewrites as follows:
Rt+1 = R

t  ['t RN + (1  't) RS]1  (19)
As population is growing in the South while the North has already achieved its demo-
graphic transition characterized by a stable population, the limit case checks: lim
t!+1
N;t =
0 and lim
t!+1
't = 0.
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Figure 1: Openness without convergence (changes wrt the closed economy steady states)
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To complete the calibration of the model with globalized nance, consider, to charac-
terize the wealth gap, the relative GDP per capita in the South as compared to the North
denoted  t:
 t =
YS;t
PopS;t
YN;t
PopN
=
AS;t
AN
1 + lS
Gs;t
1 + lN
1 + N
1 +
S;t
GS;t
(20)
An increase in  t corresponds to a reduction of the wealth gap. Note that this ratio is
independent of the pension contribution rates because their impact on savings has an
impact on the global capital accumulation and not its sharing. At the initial period,
 0 =
AS;0
AN
1+
lS
Gs;0
1+lN
1+N
1+
S;0
GS;0
, where AN = 1, lN = lS = 0:57, N = 1, S = 0:83 and GS = 1:715.
As shown in Table 2, if considering the entire population, this ratio is equal to 15:6 in
2010. Considering now the population over 18 as in the model, we mark up this number
to 16:2; setting the TFP in the South (AS;0) to 25:5% of the TFP in the North (AN).
In autarky, the domestic interest rate in the South is higher than in the North. There-
fore, after nancial globalization, equalization in regional returns yields capital ows from
the North to the South to reach around 2% of South GDP as illustrated in Fig. 1. As a
consequence, everything else being equal, the interest rates jump to the same intermediary
level equal to 4:7% on an annual basis (Fig. 1b). It increases in the North, and decreases
in the South. As both closed economies were dynamically e¢ cient, it follows that the
welfare in the South increases whereas it decreases in the North. It is worth noting that
the welfare loss in the North could be mitigated by considering H.O. e¤ects. However,
as shown by Sayan (2005), the welfare gains from trade appears quite low compared
to losses caused by capital ight. To assess the importance of the welfare change and
avoid any scale e¤ect, we compute the equivalent consumption eci;t which is the equiv-
alent constant consumption over life cycle when considering no life expectancy change:
eci;t = exp

lnCi;t+i;t+1lnZi;t+1
1+i;0

;8t  0. We then observe on Fig 1f that the equivalent
consumption at date 0 increases by 5:8% in the South and decreases by 2:2% in the North.
As the share of the South in the world population is growing, if there is no technological
growth and no institutional convergence, the world interest rate progressively increases
until reaching the Souths interest rate before openness. It follows from equation (19)
and from our calibration that the world interest factor converges monotonously to the
Souths when closed: R1 = RS = 4:89. Therefore, the positive e¤ect of openness on the
Souths welfare decreases until reaching zero and the negative e¤ect in the North goes on
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increasing until stabilizing at  7 percent of equivalent consumption.
However, reasonable doubts can be raised about the relevancy of such a scenario to
describe the long term convergence of the world economy for at least three reasons.
Firstly, the world population and especially the Souths is unlikely to grow indenitely.
Similarly, as exhibited in the United Nations (2013) projections, we have to consider the
Souths demographic transition.
Secondly, this scenario exhibits no wealth convergence of the South with the North.
From eq. (20), we can check that, if considering that AS;t = AS, GS;t = GS and S;t = S
8t  0, the wealth gap is constant over time,  t = 0, 8t  1, which yields the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: After openness has occured, ceteris paribus, there is no wealth con-
vergence of the South with the North.
As we can see on Figure 1e, after a rst decrease in the gap between the GDP per head
in the South and in the North directly due to openness (it increases by 9:6% in the South
and decreases by 4:3% in the North), the relative gap stays put: the GDP per head in
the South remains at 16:2% of the Norths in the long run. Contrasting with this result,
studies from Maddison (2008) and Wang et al. (2011) tend however to evidence Souths
wealth is catching up Norths even after nancial markets are integrated (see Table 2).
The demographic transition is characterized with a decrease in GS and an increase in s
yields a decrease in the relative wealth of the South with respect to the North . As @ t
@GS
 0
and @ t
@S
 0, it follows from eq. (20) that after openness, a technological catching-up is
required in bridging the wealth gap between the South and the North.
Thirdly, there is no institutional convergence, S;t = S;8t. However, the study of
Clement et al. (2011) tends again to support an institutional convergence (see Table 3).
In the following, we study the dynamics of the world economy considering the global
convergence in its three relevant components: technological, demographic and institu-
tional.
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4 Global convergence
Assume now that openness goes with global convergence. If we assume that the North
region has already converged to its nal pattern of society, a global convergence means
that the South region will converge towards the North pattern of society characterized by
its technology, its population features (life expectancy and total fertility) and its Social
Security here characterized by a PAYG pension scheme. From eq. (16) we can then
observe that a global convergence is characterized by the North interest rate:
R =
[  (1 + lN) + (1  )  (1  sN)  (lN + N)]
(1  )  sN  (1  N) (21)
and, as a consequence, in the long run it has no impact on the North welfare. In order
to characterize the transition path from closed economies to fully converged economies,
we then need to speciy the di¤erent convergence processes linked to the technology, the
demography and the Social Security.
4.1 Convergence speed
To characterize the technological catching-up, the North is assumed to be the technological
leader whose economys growth is stationary. In our calibration, we assumed that the
Norths TFP is AN = 1, higher than the Souths, AS; when capital markets are opened,
such that AS;0
AN
= 25:5%. We now assume that openness permits free technological transfers
and, consequently, goes along with a technological catching-up of the South according to
the following decreasing return process: AS;t
AS;t 1
=

AN
AS;t 1
A
for t  1 with A < 1.
Note that A measures the speed of technological convergence. Following this process,
the Souths TFP converges progressively towards the Norths. Similarly, to characterize
the demographic transition in the South, we assume that both its mortality rate and its
fertility converge towards those of the North which has already achieved its transition.
Here, GS;t corresponds to half the fertility rate divided by two because each household
is assumed to be composed of two parents, and 1 + S;t is the life expectancy (at 18).
The increase in the Souths life expectancy is then described by
S;t
S;t 1
= 

S;t 1 and the
decrease in its fertility rate evolves as follows: GS;t
GS;t 1
= GGS;t 1 for t  1,  and G
denoting respectively the convergence speed of life expectancy and fertility. Finally, we
assume that the contribution rate converges to the Norths and its dynamics is described
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by S;t
S;t 1
=

N
S;t 1

with  denoting the speed of institutional convergence.
Starting at date t = 0, we rst set G = 0:47 to account for the world populations
share of people between age 18 and 47 in the South as forecast by the United Nations
(2013) up to 2100 (see Table 4). It will stabilize at 90:3%. We then set  = 0:01 to
account for the world populations share of people over 18 in the South. As it is obvious
when considering stable populations, it will also stabilize at 90:3%. As already exhibited
in Table 1, the demographic transition that mimics the UN population forecast is mainly
characterized by fertility transition.
Years 2010 2040 2070 2100
(t = 0) (t = 1) (t = 2) (t = 3)
World populations share of people model 83.5 87.1 88.7 89.4
aged between 18 and 47 in the South UN data 83.5 87.6 88.7 89.4
World populations share of people model 78.9 84.5 87.0 88.2
over 18 in the South UN data 78.9 84.2 86.7 87.8
Table 4. Calibration of the demographic transition
Afterward, following eq. (20), we calibrate the speed of technological convergence A
such that the relative GDP per capita in the South with respect to the North reaches
25:5% on the basis of the population over 18 (which corresponds to 25% as in Table
2 with the entire population). It gives A = 0:242. Finally, the speed of institutional
convergence is set to  = 0:5 such that in 2040 the public pension expenditures in the
South amount to 72% of the Norths, as suggested in Table 3. This way, we obtain
a transition path from closed economies towards fully open and converged economies.
However, as this transition path results from the interaction of four distinct convergence
processes, we assume a ctional convergence pattern such that the technological catching-
up goes rst, the demographic transition goes second and the institutional convergence
goes third. Indeed, openness is rst a sharing of ideas and knowledge bringing the South
a technological catching-up through trade. Second, the technological catching-up allows a
reduction in mortality rates through medecine improvement. It leads also to a reduction
of the fertility which, along with the mortality reduction, characterizes the demographic
transition. Finally, through urbanization and social pressure, social protection follows.
By doing so, we can decompose the transition pattern starting from the technological
catching-up.
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Figure 2: Technological catching-up (changes wrt the scenario with globalized nance)
4.2 Technological catching-up
Figure 2 presents the changes with respect to the simulations obtained in the economic
openness conguration when no convergence of any type is assumed, i.e. only with glob-
alized nance. Unsurprisingly, in such a scenario the increase in the TFP in the South
boosts its demand for capital. As a consequence, the world interest rate (Fig. 2b) as well
as the Norths saving rate (Fig. 2c) increase. There are more capital ows from the North
to the South (Fig. 2d). These e¤ects are even rst reinforced by a reduced Souths saving
rate. Indeed, as young workers in the South now anticipate the increase of their future
income due to the stronger economic growth, they start with consuming more and save
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less as compared with the previous scenario (Fig. 2c). However, as the growth rate of the
TFP in the South slows down during the technological catching-up process, an initially
weaker saving rate in the South then grows and eventually converges to the same level as
before. This higher saving rate in the South associated with the growing share of South
in the world population explains why capital ows going from the South to the North is
reduced and become even slightly negative (Fig. 2d). This also explains the shape of the
GDP in the North (Fig. 2e). The more capital ows from the North to the South, the
lower the Norths GDP. Therefore, when the North-to-South capital ows are the rst
to increase, the wider the South-North GDP gap between the two scenarios - with and
without catching-up -, while it narrows until vanishing when capital ows are reversed.
Finally, when the relative population of the North becomes negligible, the world interest
rate converges towards that of the South closed economy and capital ows as a percentage
of the South production also become negligible.
4.3 Demographic transition
4.3.1 Mortality reduction
Now, we assume the technological di¤usion results in a medical progress which yields
a reduction in the Souths mortality rate. However, to replicate the structure of the world
population as forecasted by the United Nations (2013), the North-South mortality rate
convergence is assumed to be very slow. Hence,  is set to 0:01. Therefore, only light
e¤ects should be initially expected from this convergence. To characterize the evolutions
observed from the rst simulated periods until the long run, the Figure 3 presents the
steady steate values obtained when the complete mortality convergence is achieved. As
evidenced by our simulations, people in the South save more with respect to the previous
case with economic openness and technological catching-up because they tend to live
longer (Fig. 3d). Indeed, they need to nance a longer period with no activity, knowing
that pensions are very low. On the world capital market, as the supply of capital increases,
this e¤ect has a negative impact on the interest rate (Fig. 3c). In return, people in the
North save less. Obviously, the capital ows to the South are rstly reduced (Fig. 3e) as
compared with the previous scenario with no mortality reduction in the South. However,
for the same reason as in the previous section, when the relative population of the North
becomes negligible, capital ows as a percentage of the South production become also
19
0 5 10 15
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
b) Changes in South Population (% of world)
0 5 10 15
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
x 10-3 e) Changes in capital inflows to South (%GDP)
0 5 10
92
94
96
98
100
a) Life expectancy in the South (age 18, % of North)
1
0 5 10
-0.5
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
1
c) Changes in return to capital (annual)
0 5 10
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
1
d) Changes in saving rate
North
South
0 5 10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
1
f) Changes in South GDP per capita (%of North)
Figure 3: Mortality transition (changes wrt the scenario with technological catching-up)
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Figure 4: Fertility transition (changes wrt to the scenario with technological catching-up
and mortality transition)
negligible. As Social Security is less developed in the South, the interest rate converges
to an intermediate level between South and North closed economies equal to 4:9% on an
annual basis, i.e. minus approximatively 0:5 percentage point with respect to the previous
scenario. Observe also that, as exhibited in equation (20), as the proportion of people with
no productive activity increases in the South, the North-South wealth gap widens so that
  is reduced until reaching  7% in the long run relatively to the no-mortality-reduction
scenario (Fig. 3f).
4.3.2 Fertility transition
Let us now assume that the technological di¤usion results also in a "higher" individual
education level which allows a better birth control, hence to a reduction in fertility rate.
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This phenomenon associated with the mortality reduction illustrates the concept of de-
mographic transition. Assuming G = 0:47, we observe that fertility in the South reaches
its steady state level after 15 periods (Fig 4a). Compared with the previous scenario,
we observe that at steady state the share of South in the world population (over 18) is
approximately 10 percentage points lower (Fig 4b), which corresponds to slightly more
than 90% of the world population in the very long term. Note that, as fertility conver-
gence is much faster than the mortalitys, the evolution of the Souths share in the world
population is slightly non monotonous. The decrease due to this quick fertility reduction
leads, during the process of demographic transition, to a lower share than its steady state
value. That is why it slightly increases after period 15, due to mortality decreases, to
reach its steady state value. From an economic perspective, as the growth of the working
population in the South is reduced, the demand for capital there is weaker. The interest
rate decreases to stabilize at 4% per year, i.e. approximatively 0:9 percentage point lower
as compared with the previous scenario (Fig 4c) and lower than the North autarky econ-
omys. Indeed, in this scenario, everything converges except Social Security. Therefore,
compared with the Norths closed economy, this world economy has, on average, a lower
Social Security size and then more savings. As a consequence of the weaker demand for
capital in the south and the decrease in the world interest rate, both saving rates in the
North and in the South decrease (Fig 4d). Despite the weaker demand for capital in
the South, we observe that capital inows to South as percentage of GDP increase after
period 1 (Fig 4e). However, it only characterizes a more intense decrease in GDP due
to the decrease of the labor force than in capital inows. Indeed, at steady state, as the
South is characterized by a higher saving rate due to its lower Social Security size, the
capital ows in percentage of GDP go well from the South to the North. Finally, following
eq. (20), the decrease in the working population share in the South results in less wealth
convergence such that the GDP per capita in the South is more than 7% lower compared
with the North GDP per capita in the previous scenario at steady state (Fig 4f).
4.4 Institutional convergence
Finally, we add to the previous economic development (technological progress and
demographic transition) a social pressure for a fairer share of income between young
and old because, otherwise, the latter would benet less from growth than the former. A
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Figure 5: Institutional convergence (changes wrt the scenario with technological catching-
up and demographic transition)
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Figure 6: Welfare analysis
higher Social Security size (via a higher contribution rate as illustrated in Fig. 5a) reduces
the savings in the South with respect to the previous scenario (Fig. 5c). This reduction
is intended to mimic the progressive increase of Social Security. It follows that the net
demand for capital is higher in the South. On the world capital market, the interest rate
is pushed up and people in the North save more (Figs. 5b and c). As a result, capital
ows from the North to the South are higher (Fig. 5d).
5 Welfare analysis
One important consequence of the economic openness is its impact on each generations
welfare. Figure 6 presents, for the North and the South, the changes in the time path of
their respective welfare (valued by the equivalent consumption as described in section 3)
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with respect to their corresponding level in the scenario above.
The gross e¤ect when we suppose no convergence is negative in the North due to
dynamic e¢ ciency.
When openness is assumed to generate positive externalities on TFP growth in the
South through for instance technological transfers, the global impact could be positive
during the rst periods of the transition path whenever a higher interest rate generates
a strong positive income e¤ect for elderly. It is the case with our parameters but only in
period 0 (Fig. 6a). Afterward, as a higher TFP in the South attracts more capital from
the North, weakening production in the North (2e), a negative e¤ect is exerted on the
Norths welfare that reaches a minimum of  6% in period 3. After period 3, this negative
e¤ect gradually slackens as the GDP in the North recovers, until nally cancelling at
steady state. In the South, an improved labor productivity unambiguously leads to higher
welfare.
In addition, if a demographic transition towards a stationary population with higher
life expectancy is triggered, the direction of the net ows of capital reverses so that,
nally, the North benets from capital transfers from the South as compared to previous
scenarios. Consequently, a positive welfare gain is observed immediately following the
mortality convergence, after 2 periods with the fertility convergence. Of course, as people
in the South are less numerous than in a context of growing population and live longer,
they benet from a higher welfare.
Moreover, if the South adopts the North Social Security standards, it saves less and,
globally, there is less productive capital both in the North and the South and consequently,
in both regions, people endure a weaker welfare with respect to the previous scenario. In
the long run, the welfare levels in the North and the South converge to the same level as
the one observed in the North closed economy because the two regions are identical. Note
that, due the steep evolution of the interest rate over time, people benet, respectively,
in period 0 in the South and in periods 0 and 1 in the North from the increase in Social
Security size in the South.
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Conclusion
This paper develops a tractable two-period two-region OLG model. It allows to detail the
analytical solution of the dynamics of the world interest rate. This analytical approach ex-
poses clearly the existing interactions between the di¤erent regional components of world
equilibrium, contributing to a better understanding of the main mechanisms triggered by
globalization.
This result is completed by numerical simulations. In a context of large domestic
di¤erences, our study permits to analyse global consequences from trade between the
developed and emerging regions. The calibration set mimics the North-South di¤erences
as described by macroeconomic and demographic empirical data bases. More precisely,
we investigate three types of convergence associated with economic openness. Our results
show that the technological catching-up alone leads to the maximum welfare loss for
the North. If we add to this rst change a demographic transition, the welfare gain is
maximum in the South and the North obtains positive welfare gain in a nite horizon.
Lastly, an institutional convergence of the North-South pension schemes reduces saving
rate in the South and induces a welfare loss in the North for any subsequent period.
The advantages of our approach rooted in an analytical framework are multifold. First,
tractability allows to evidence clear-cut transitory dynamics. Second, it gives way to pos-
sible investigations of general analytical properties. Lastly, the following extensions may
be contemplated: "true" spatial setting (several countries and/or regions more precisely
and realistically di¤erentiated) ; mobile workforce (migration) ; the implications of work-
ers skills and the link between development issues and economic geography literature
(Krugman, 1991; Abdel-Rahman et al., 2005).
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Mathematical appendix and sensitivity analysis
From eqs. (9) and (10) we have:
X
i
Ki;t+1 =
X
i
(Gi;t+1 + li;t+1) Ni;t  ki;t+1: (22)
From (8) and (9), it follows that wage in each region depends on the world interest
rate:
wi;t = A
1
1 
i;t  (1  )  

1  R

 1
i;t : (23)
From eqs. (6) and (7), we have:
Si;t = si;t  (1   i;t)  wi;t   (1  si;t)  (li;t+1 +Gi;t+1   i;t+1)  wi;t+1
Rt+1
: (24)
From eq (23) it follows that:
Si;t = si;t  (1   i;t)  wi;t   (1  si;t)  (li;t+1 +Gi;t+1   i;t+1)  1   ki;t+1: (25)
It follows that:
P
iNi;t  Si;t
=P
iNi;t 

si;t  (1   i;t)  wi;t   (1  si;t)  (li;t+1 +Gi;t+1   i;t+1)  1   ki;t+1
 : (26)
Following eqs. (11) and (9), the dynamic general equilibrium can be characterized by:
Rt+1 = R

t 
"P
i[(Gi;t+1+li;t+1)+(1 )(1 si;t)(li;t+1+Gi;t+1 i;t+1)]i;tA
1
1 
i;t+1
(1 )Pi si;t(1  i;t)i;tA 11 i;t
#1 
(27)
and at the steady state, the interest factor is:
R =
P
i[(Gi+li)+(1 )(1 si)(li+Gi i)]ii
(1 )Pi si(1  i)ii (28)
with i =

Ai
A1
 1
1 
:
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Figure 7: Sensitivity: faster TFP convergence (A = 0:01)
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Figure 8: Sensitivity: faster mortality rate convergence ( = 0:01)
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Figure 9: Sensitivity: faster fertility rate convergence (G = 0:01)
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Figure 10: Sensitivity: faster Social Security (payroll tax rate) convergence ( = 0:01)
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